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Abstract:
Many papers for example Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) have shown that in a New
Keynesian model with a signiﬁcant degree of forward-looking behaviour, policy regimes
that target either the change in the output-gap (speed limit targeting) or nominal income
growth can considerably reduce the size of the stabilization bias–the ineﬃciency that
arises when a central bank conducts policy under discretion as opposed to commitment.
Inﬂation targeting can also reduce the size of the stabilization bias but unless inﬂation
expectations in the model are predominantly backward-looking, this targeting regime does
not perform as well as speed limit or nominal income growth targeting. Jensen (2002)
and Walsh (2003) obtain their results using a New Keynesian model where changes in
the policy rate aﬀect macroeconomic variables immediately. In this paper, we compare
the performance of several targeting regimes by using a New Keynesian model that
includes a delayed response of monetary policy as a result of information lags. We
ﬁnd two results that are substantially diﬀerent from Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003).
First the size of the stabilization bias is considerably reduced. Second, a regime that
targets inﬂation outperforms a regime that targets either the change in the output-gap
or the growth in nominal income even when inﬂation expectations are very forward-looking.
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11 Introduction
There is a general consensus among economists that the purely discretionary policy that
many central banks adopted during the 1970s contributed to the poor economic performance
of that period. During that time, inﬂation rose dramatically and was very volatile while
output and unemployment were unstable. Many economists attribute the rise in inﬂation in
the 1970s to a so-called inﬂation bias that resulted from central banks being too ambitious in
their output and unemployment target. It is well understood now that targeting an output
or an unemployment level that exceeds the full employment level is futile since rational
expectations agents will realize that this policy will ultimately create inﬂation. As a result,
they will adjust their inﬂation expectations accordingly. In the end, their expectations
become self-fulﬁlling as such policy ultimately leads to an inﬂation rate that is above what
the central bank intended but an output level that remains at full employment. This is the
famous inﬂation bias result that is forcefully described by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
Barro and Gordon (1983) in their seminal papers.
Compared to the pure discretionary approach that characterized monetary policy in
the 1970s that eventually led to the so-called inﬂation bias, most central banks in OECD
countries are now guided by a formal objective that involves achieving a low and stable
inﬂation rate. This is achieved either explicitly through a framework of inﬂation targets or
implicitly through an objective of price stability. Most economists and central bankers agree
that the adoption of inﬂation targeting as a framework has largely improved the performance
of monetary policy. Inﬂation in these countries has declined and has remained low and stable
while the volatility of output of output is smaller. Moreover, the conduct of monetary policy
has become more transparent and accountable. The transparency of inﬂation-targeting as a
framework has allowed agents to understand better how the central bank reacts to expected
economic outcomes.
At the center of the inﬂation targeting framework is a central bank that is constrained
by a commitment to low and stable inﬂation. This approach to monetary policy avoids the
problems associated with unfettered discretion while at the same time does not force the
central bank to abide to iron-clad rules that are either impossible to follow or that are likely
to be abandoned. As argued by Blinder (1988, p52), “constrained discretion is the new rule”
as it allows policy-makers a lot of freedom to respond to shocks and unforseen developments
but at the same time forced them to be constrained by a commitment to a given objective.
2The literature on rules and discretion has shown that there is another advantage to con-
strained discretion. It is well-known that even in the absence of an over-ambitious output
target and an inﬂation bias, purely discretionary policies in models with forward-looking
agents remain ineﬃcient, since it leads to a stabilization bias.1 This bias arises under pure
discretion because of insuﬃcient inertia in the policy actions of the central bank and usually
manifests itself through greater inﬂation variability and excessive output stabilization. As
Clarida, Gal` ı, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (1999, 2003) show in models in which expec-
tations are important for determining inﬂation, optimal monetary policy under commitment
(the ﬁrst best outcome) exhibits a considerable degree of inertia whereas policy under pure
discretion does not.
An inertial response on the part of the central bank is desirable in models with forward-
looking agents since it aﬀects the expectations of agents in a favourable manner and hence
result in a better inﬂation—output-gap trade-oﬀ. The reason for this is intuitive; with
forward-looking agents, the expected path of policy and expected inﬂation become more
important. As a result, by making the policy response history dependent, the current actions
of the central bank can appropriately aﬀect private sector expectations of future inﬂation.
This, in turn, improves the performance of monetary policy and the trade-oﬀ the central
bank faces. Although optimal, policy under commitment may not be time-consistent. If
commitment to an optimal rule is not feasible and policy under pure discretion leads to a
large ineﬃciency, optimal delegation under discretion would be a second best solution.
In two recent papers, using a hybrid version of the New Keynesian model with no un-
certainty and where changes in the policy rate aﬀect macroeconomic variables immediately,
Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) numerically show that a purely discretionary targeting
regime leads to a large stabilization bias. More importantly, they show that the ineﬃciency
arising from the purely discretionary can be greatly reduced if either nominal income growth
or the change in the output gap is targeted. The latter which has been labelled speed
limit targeting by Walsh (2003), can replicate closely the optimal precommitment outcome,
in particular when expectations are predominantly forward-looking. A regime that targets
inﬂation can reduce the size of the bias also. However, unless inﬂation expectations are
predominantly backward-looking, it does not perform as well as the two targeting regimes
1In their paper, Dennis and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2002), using various calibrated and estimated closed-economy
models ﬁnd that the stabilization bias can be large and depends on many factors, notably on the lag structure
of the model.
3advocated by Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003).
Walsh (2003) argues that a central bank concerned with stabilizing the change in the
output gap and inﬂation is optimal since it introduces the same kind of inertia in its policy
actions found under precommitment. In fact, the ﬁrst-order condition under the timeless
commitment outcome is very similar to a policy of speed limit targeting. Nominal income
growth targeting also imparts a similar kind of persistence in the policy actions of the central
bank, thereby replicating the ﬁrst-best commitment outcome.2
One obvious shortcoming of the conventional New Keynesian framework that is used by
Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) is the absence of realistic lags in the transmission from
policy actions to macroeconomic variables. Embodied in the model is the assumption that
changes in the policy actions of the central bank aﬀects macroeconomic variables immedi-
ately. Instead, conventional wisdom among central bankers is that monetary policy aﬀects
output and inﬂation with long lags.3 The typical view among central banks is that changes
in the policy rate aﬀect inﬂation and output after four to six quarters. This view is also
widely supported by numerous studies that employ VARs. (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans, 2001 for example).
One natural question that arises is whether the stabilization bias and the choice of the
optimal targeting regime are diﬀerent in a model that retains the same characteristics of the
New Keynesian one but that also features a delayed response of macroeconomic variables
to changes in the monetary policy rate. This is precisely the objective of this paper. We
introduce delayed eﬀects of monetary policy by assuming that expenditure and pricing deci-
sions are predetermined. The model that we use is very similar to Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999) and Woodford (2003) who introduce predetermined decisions through an information
lag. We ﬁnd that modifying the New Keynesian model to allow for lags in the transmission
mechanism has important implications for both the choice of the optimal targeting regime
and for the size of the stabilization bias.
When expectations are predetermined with respect to policy, this implies that current
expenditures can be aﬀected only if private agents can incorporate the central bank’s most
recent policy decisions in their decision making process. This is possible only if the actions
of the central bank are forecastable in advance. If expectations are predetermined and the
2Others have proposed interest rate smoothing (Woodford, 1999), price level targeting (Vestin, 2000) and
money growth targeting (S¨ oderstr¨ om, 2001) as a way of improving the pure discretionary outcome.
3see Friedman’s (1968) well-known description of such ”long and variable lags”
4actions of the central bank are not forecastable in advance, then this limits the ability of
the central bank to inﬂuence the decisions of private agents. As one of the main advantages
of commitment is its ability to appropriately aﬀect the expectations of private agents and
hence their current expenditure decisions, the presence of the information lags, therefore
reduces the value of commitment. This will have important implications for the size of the
stabilization bias and the choice of the optimal targeting regime.
Another important diﬀerence between the conventional New Keynesian model and a
model that features an information lag, is the ability of the central bank to perfectly insulate
the economy from demand shocks. In the former case it can but not in the type of framework
that we employ in this paper. Targeting regimes such as speed limit and nominal income
growth are particularly eﬃcient in improving the inﬂation—output-gap trade-oﬀ when the
economy is predominantly hit with shocks that pose society with a trade-oﬀ, that is cost-push
shocks. On the other hand, when shocks such as demand and technology—that poses no
trade-oﬀ to society—become increasingly important, the need to delegate monetary policy to
a central bank that targets nominal income growth or the change in the output gap becomes
less attractive. 4
Our results are fairly diﬀerent from Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003). First, we ﬁnd that
the size of the stabilization bias is smaller in the model with information lags. Second, we
ﬁnd that inﬂation targeting outperforms regimes that target the change in the output gap
and the growth in nominal income. More importantly, we show that this result is robust
irrespective of the degree of forward or backward-looking behaviour in the pricing equation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the parameter values
that we use to simulate our diﬀerent targeting regimes. The diﬀerent targeting regimes are
explained in Section 3. Our results are discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model with Delayed Eﬀects
Embodied in the conventional New Keynesian framework is the assumption that policy
actions aﬀect macroeconomic variables immediately. Instead, conventional wisdom among
central bankers is that monetary policy aﬀects output and inﬂation with long lags.5 The
typical view among central banks is that changes in the policy rate aﬀect inﬂation and
4This is a result that Jensen (1999) also ﬁnds in his paper. Nominal income growth targeting performs
poorly when the volatility of technology shocks are high.
5see Friedman’s (1968) well-known description of such ”long and variable lags”
5output after four to six quarters. This view is also widely supported by numerous studies
that employ VARs (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2001 for example). The model
with delayed eﬀect that we use in this paper is a simple extension of the basic New Keynesian
model and examples of such models can be found in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and
Woodford (2003). We brieﬂy describe the model below.
The economy consists of a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. Expenditure
decisions in the model are predetermined or are made one period in advance and can subse-
quently be changed only because of shocks to the economy. In this respect, the model diﬀers
from the conventional New Keynesian model since the latter assumes that expenditure de-
cisions and stochastic shocks occur contemporaneously. This diﬀerence in timing decisions
also implies that central banks can no longer perfectly insulate the economy from demand
shocks as it is the case in the conventional New Keynesian model, unless these shocks are
perfectly forecastable.
We follow Amato and Laubach (2003) and assume that a proportion, α of consumers
are so-called rule of thumb and they choose their consumption level based on their previous
consumption. Denoting the consumption of rule of thumb consumers by Cr, they set
C
r
t = Ct−1 (1)
The remaining consumers, that is 1 − α, optimizes and maximize their utility function






















Pt ˜ Ct +
Bt
1 + Rt
≤ Bt+1 + WtNt + Tt (3)
where β denotes a discount factor, Nt hours worked from which the agent derives disutility,
η−1 the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ϕ−1 the labour supply elasticity. The
main diﬀerence between this model and the basic New Keynesian model is that expectations
are conditional upon information up to an including t-1 and not t, reﬂecting the fact that
expenditure decisions are predetermined. Expenditure decisions can be predetermined if it
is costly to acquire information or simply because it takes time to plan. In our case, we
assume that there is an information lag that forces these agents to take their decisions one
period in advance.











where ζ denotes the elasticity of substitution among the diﬀerent goods. The associated
















In our model, since there is no government expenditure, the resource constraint is Yt = Ct.
Hence Yt = Ct = αCt−1 + (1 − α) ˜ Ct.
Using the ﬁrst-order conditions from our maximization problem and substituting the
resource constraint gives the familiar Euler equation whose log-linearized version yields the
following equation:
yt = θyt−1 + (1 − θ)Et−1yt+1 − σ[Et−1it − Et−1πt+1] + ut, (7)
where θ = α
1+α and σ = 1−α
(1+α)η. An error term, ut has been added. This variable ut represents
a demand shock. ut follows a stationary univariate autoregressive process and is given by
ut+1 = γuut + ηt+1 where ηt+1 ֒→ i.i.d (0, σ2
η) and 0 ≤ γu < 1.
This equation is a dynamic generalization of an IS function derived from consumers
optimization and in the presence of rule of thumb consumers. When θ = 0, this equation
collapses to an “intertemporal IS” function, that is, it represents the standard log-linear
approximation of the Euler equation arising from the representative agent’s consumption
choice.
2.1 Firms
Firms are assumed to produce a continuum of goods and operate in a monopolistically
competitive market with decreasing returns to scale. The model abstract from capital and
assumes that the production function is given by:
Yit = (AtNit)
χ (8)


















Using the production function, equation 6 and Yit = Cit, we obtain the following condition
in log-linearized form:





(pit − pt) (11)
Using the above and the log-linearized ﬁrst-order condition for labour, real marginal cost
denoted by ˆ mc is thus given by:
ˆ mct =
 
1 − χ + χη + ϕ
χ
!
yt − (1 + ϕ)at (12)
We make the same assumption as in Amato and Laubach (2003) and assume that a fraction
ω of ﬁrms use a backward-looking rule-of-thumb while the remaining ﬁrms optimize using
Calvo pricing. As in Woodford (Chapter 3), we assume the optimal price chosen by these
ﬁrms takes eﬀect one period later.
The log-linearized aggregate price index is therefore given by:









t + (1 − ω)p
f
t (14)
where the rule-of-thumb ﬁrms are denoted by the superscript b and the optimizing ﬁrms
by the superscript f. The log-linearized index of prices is thus a convex combination of the
prices set by the optimizing and forward-looking ﬁrms and the remaining rule-of-thumb or
backward-looking ones.




t = (1 − βψ)Et−1( ˆ mct + pt) + βχEt−1p
f
t+1 (15)
8Note that because the price chosen takes one period to take eﬀect, we have this diﬀerent
timing for expectations. The rule-of-thumb ﬁrms are assumed to set their prices according
to the average price in the previous period corrected for past inﬂation. Thus
p
b
t = ¯ p
∗
t−1 + πt−1 (16)
where past inﬂation serves as the forecast for actual inﬂation.




bπt−1 + κEt−1mct. (17)







ψ + χ(1 − ψ(1 − β))
To complete our model and to make it comparable to the model used by Jensen (2002)
and Walsh (2003), we impose the restriction that the sum on the backward and forward
looking coeﬃcient sum to one and use the fact that there is a proportional relationship
between the marginal cost and the output-gap. We obtain the following equation:
πt = (1 − φ)βEt−1πt+1 + φπt−1 + κEt−1(yt − ¯ yt) + et. (18)
where φ is the degree of backwardness and β is the discount factor. The term et is a cost-push
shock and is deﬁned as et+1 = γeet + ǫt+1, where ǫt+1 ֒→ i.i.d (0, σ2
ǫ) and 0 ≤ γe < 1.
Potential output, ¯ yt, is assumed to follow an AR(1) process and is given by ¯ yt+1 =
¯ γ¯ yt + ξt+1, where ξt+1 ֒→ i.i.d (0, σ2
ξ) and 0 ≤ ¯ γ < 1. The covariance matrix of shocks is
assumed to be diagonal; i.e. shocks are independent.
2.2 Model parameters
Since obtaining analytical results are not possible here, to evaluate the size of the stabilization
bias and the diﬀerent targeting regimes, we follow Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003) and
resort to numerical simulations. We ﬁrst evaluate the size of the stabilization bias and the
performance of the diﬀerent targeting regimes using similar parameter values selected by
Walsh (2003). For the inﬂation equation, we assume, β = 0.99, φ = 0.5 and κ = 0.05. For
the IS equation, we have σ = 1.5 and θ = 0.5. Finally, the parameters for the stochastic
shocks are ση = σǫ = 0.015, σξ = 0.005 and γu = 0.3, γe = 0, ¯ γ = 0.97. In addition to these
baseline values, we perform an important sensitivity test. Since the size of the stabilization
9bias and the performance of the diﬀerent targeting regimes depend heavily on the value that
φ takes–the parameter that governs the degree to which inﬂation expectations are either
backward or forward-looking–we evaluate them by varying φ over the range 0 to 1..6
3 Alternative Targeting Regimes
The policy regimes considered in this paper are all evaluated according to a loss function.














where LT denotes society’s loss function, β the representative agent’s discount factor and
πt the deviation of inﬂation from a given target (assumed to be zero). The parameter λ
measures society’s preferences for output stabilization relative to inﬂation stabilization.7
The weight society assigns to output relative to inﬂation stabilization can be diﬀerent from
the central bank. For example, the central bank can have a stronger dislike for inﬂation
compared to society as in Rogoﬀ (1985) and thus would assign more weight in its objective
function to the stabilization of inﬂation relative to output. In our model, this preference is
represented by a lower value for λ. As the discount factor approaches one from below, this
loss function can be expressed by its unconditional expected value:
L
T
s = λV ar(yt − yt) + V ar(πt). (20)
We use (20) to evaluate all optimal targeting regimes and set λ to 0.25 in the baseline case.
The objective of the central bank is to choose a path for the short-term interest rate to
minimise society’s loss function. However, the actual conduct of monetary policy is delegated
to a central bank that can independently choose a loss function that is diﬀerent from society
both in terms of the variables included and in terms of the relative weights on the diﬀerent
variables. The reason for this optimal delegation is to reduce the stabilization bias associated
with purely discretionary policy.
6We have also performed several other sensitivity tests. We changed the relative size of the structural
shocks, the proportion of rule of thumb consumers with respect to optimizing ones and the slope of the
Phillips curve.
7This quadratic loss function is standard in the literature and is an important element of ”The Science
of Monetary Policy”. Woodford (2001) has shown that this function (under certain conditions) represents a
second order Taylor approximation of the utility of a representative agent.
10In addition to the commitment case, we consider the following targeting regimes. The
pure discretion regime is the case where the central banker simply implements society’s loss
function, and therefore corresponds to the case where a benevolent government conducts
discretionary monetary policy by itself. It will mainly serve as the “worst case” scenario.8
Second, a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting regime is deﬁned as the case where the bank is required
to aim at price stability but not at all costs in terms of the output gap. The central bank
implements society’s objective function but is allowed to choose the optimal weight it places
on output stabilization relative to inﬂation stabilization. A conservative central bank as
in Rogoﬀ (1985) will place more weight on inﬂation relative to output-gap stabilization
compared to society. Third, a speed limit targeting regime consists of targeting the change
in the output gap and inﬂation. Fourth, we consider a nominal income growth targeting
regime as in Jensen (2002) where the central bank faces a trade-oﬀ between the nominal
income growth and the output gap.
The single period loss functions for each targeting regimes are shown in Table 1 where x
denotes the output gap.
Table 1: Alternative targeting regimes







Inﬂation targeting (IT) π2
t + b λIT x2
t
Speed-Limit targeting (SLT) π2
t + b λSLT∆x2
t
Nominal Income Growth Targeting (NIT) λx2
t + b λNIT2(πt + ∆yt)2
For each and independently of the targeting regime, a grid search is performed to ﬁnd the
optimal value of b λ. For example, inﬂation targeting involves the central bank choosing the
optimal relative weight on x2
t. In the case of inﬂation targeting, depending on its preferences,
the central bank may attach a higher or lower value to inﬂation compared to society. We
proceed in the same fashion for all the other targeting regimes, each time ﬁnding the optimal
(relative) weight the central bank assigns to its targeting variables.
To evaluate the welfare diﬀerential between precommitment and the diﬀerent targeting
regimes, we use two alternative measures as in, Dennis and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2002) and Lam
8The commitment can be regarded as the ﬁrst-best outcome, optimal delegation as second-best, a simple
policy rule as third-best and the purely discretionary regime as fourth-best.
11(2003). The ﬁrst measure is the percentage deviation of the optimal targeting regimes from






where LTR and LC are, respectively, the loss function value under the optimal targeting
regime and precommitment.
As this measure does not have a direct economic interpretation, we follow Jensen (2002),
and also calculate the permanent deviation of inﬂation from target (the inﬂation equivalent)
when the central bank moves from precommitment to an optimal discretionary regime. This




(LTR − LC). (22)
This measure has a more direct economic interpretation, because it indicates how much
inﬂation is higher on average if the central bank chooses to conduct monetary policy in a
discretionary fashion.
Before evaluating the diﬀerent targeting regimes, we simulate model under commitment
and pure discretion and examine the nature of the stabilization bias in the standard New
Keynesian model and in the model containing delayed eﬀects. Since the parameter φ–that
governs the degree of forward-looking price setting behaviour for the size of the stabilization
bias–is important in determining the size of that bias, we compare the outcome under pure
discretion and commitment for values of φ ranging from 0 to 1.
3.1 The stabilization bias in a model with and without information lags
In this section, we compare the dynamic response of the economy following a one-unit cost-
push shock under precommitment and pure discretion using a model with and without
delayed eﬀects. We use the baseline parameters presented in Table 1 to generate our impulse
response functions
12Figure 1: Impulse-Response Function in the Baseline New Keynesian Model
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Precommitment
Discretion
Figure 1 shows the response of the economy to a one-period cost-push shock. The unit
cost-push shock leads to an increase in inﬂation and to a negative output gap under both
discretion and precommitment. To dampen the inﬂationary pressures, the central bank
raises interest rates under both precommitment and discretion. The policy response under
the commitment is, however, less aggressive and more inertial. Under precommitment, the
central bank promises to let the period of inﬂation be followed by a period of deﬂation by
creating a more persistent output gap. Since inﬂation is forward-looking, the promise of a
future deﬂation has a stabilizing role on actual inﬂation. Consequently, this results in a more
favourable inﬂation—output-gap trade-oﬀ.
On the other hand, under discretion, the central bank has no incentive to let the contrac-
tion persist once inﬂation is back at its target, since the ensuing period of deﬂation is costly
in terms of welfare. This results in a larger and less inertial policy response and hence to a
less favourable inﬂation—output-gap trade-oﬀ.
13Figure 2: Impulse-Response Function in the Model with Delayed Eﬀects
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Model with information and tranmission lag 
When we take into account the delayed response of the macroeconomy to changes in
the policy rate of the central bank, it is seen in Figure 2 that the dynamics of the model
under precommitment and discretion are closer, especially for the output gap. Although the
response of the central bank under precommitment is still more inertial, the interest rate
diﬀerential between precommitment and discretion is smaller in the model featuring lags.
Consistent with these smaller diﬀerences in impulse-response functions, we ﬁnd that the
diﬀerence between precommitment and discretion—the stabilization bias—is smaller in the
model featuring a delayed eﬀect or information lag compared to the baseline closed-economy
framework. Our numerical results conﬁrm that the gains from precommitment are eﬀectively
smaller in the model featuring transmission and information lags.
3.2 The importance of φ for the stabilization bias
Since the size of the stabilization bias depends heavily on the degree of persistence in inﬂation,
in Figure 3, we show how important this parameter (φ) is for determining the size of this
ineﬃciency. We allow for various degrees of forward-looking price setting behaviour by
varying φ between 0 and 1. We expect the stabilization bias to gradually disappear as φ
tends to one—as the aggregate supply becomes completely backward-looking—and to be
large when the aggregate supply is forward-looking. Figure 3 shows the implications of
14increasing the importance of backward-looking expectations (the value of φ) on the size of
stabilization bias in the baseline model and the model featuring delayed eﬀects. The ﬁrst
panel shows the stabilization bias in terms of percentage deviation while the second panel
displays the permanent increase in inﬂation.
Figure 3: Size of Stabilization Bias


































































In both models, the size of the stabilization bias becomes increasingly smaller as the
degree of backward-lookingness increases. This result is intuitive. If inﬂation expectations
are predominantly backward-looking and expected inﬂation plays a very small role, the
stabilization bias should disappear. This is exactly the case in both models.
As expected, the size of the stabilization bias is considerably reduced when the baseline
model is modiﬁed to include an information lag. What is striking in our results is that in the
model featuring an information lag, even with forward-looking expectations in the Phillips
curve, the gains from commitment are very small. Since the gains from precommitment are
minuscule, this suggests that a targeting regime such as inﬂation should perform well and
the need to delegate monetary policy to a central bank that targets either the change in the
output gap or nominal income growth becomes less attractive.
154 Results
Table 2 reports the results for the diﬀerent targeting when the baseline parameter values are
used. We present society’s loss under ﬁve diﬀerent monetary policy regimes. In addition, we
also present the percentage deviation and the inﬂation equivalent of the four discretionary
regimes from precommitment.
Table 2: Results with Baseline Parameters
Baseline model Information lag
Loss Ld πd Loss Ld πd
COM 9.94 - - 5.36 - -
PD 13.16 32.41 1.79 6.16 15.03 0.90
CPI 11.76 18.32 1.35 5.81 8.49 0.67
SLT 9.97 0.30 0.17 5.81 8.41 0.67
NIT2 10.00 0.61 0.25 5.91 10.37 0.74
When the baseline model is considered, our results conﬁrm the prior ﬁndings of Jensen
(2002) and Walsh (2003). The size of the stabilization bias is fairly important. According
to Table 2, a purely discretionary regime would, compared to commitment, increase the loss
function by around 32% and would lead to an increase of 1.79% in inﬂation on average.9 The
reason, as explained in the section 2.4, is that policy under discretion leads to insuﬃcient
inertia in the policy actions of the central bank. Moving from a purely discretionary regime
to a regime of inﬂation targeting (with a conservative manner) improves the outcome.10
However, the welfare gain of adopting inﬂation targeting is fairly limited since the deviation
from commitment in terms of welfare remains important.
On the other hand, delegating monetary policy to a central bank that targets the change
in the output-gap (SLT) or nominal income growth (NIT2) as in Jensen (2002), results in
large reductions in the loss function. Both targeting regimes, in particular, SLT, are able
to replicate the precommitment outcome and are clearly superior to a regime that targets
inﬂation. The reason, as explained in the introduction, is their ability to induce inertia in
the policy response of the central bank, thereby acting more in accordance with the outcome
under commitment.
9Inﬂation returns to its target of zero under all regimes. However, the transition path is very diﬀerent
under each targeting regime.
10The optimal λ is 0.15, lower than the value that society assigns to output stabilization.
16Our results are however very diﬀerent when the targeting regimes are evaluated in the
model featuring delayed eﬀects. First, the stabilization bias, and thus the need for optimal
delegation is considerably reduced. The quantitative gain from commitment in terms of
percentage deviation is now around 15%, compared to 32% in the baseline New Keynesian
model. Going from pure discretion to inﬂation targeting leads to a further reduction in the
loss function. The percentage gains from precommitment falls to 8.5%.11
SLT continues to perform well, but there is virtually no diﬀerence between this regime
and a regime that targets inﬂation. The latter outperforms a regime that targets the growth
in nominal income. Since the value that φ takes is important for determining not only the
size of the stabilization bias but also how each targeting regime performs, we repeat the
same exercise, but this time varying φ from 0 to 1. Our results are shown in Figure 3.
First inﬂation targeting outperforms regimes that target the change in the output-gap
and the growth in nominal income when inﬂation expectations are predominantly backward-
looking. This result is similar to Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003). When inﬂation expecta-
tions are mostly backward-looking, the optimal policy for the central bank is to react quickly
and avoid doing too little too late. Since inﬂation expectations do not matter in this case,
targeting regimes that smooth interest rates too much will not perform well under these
conditions. This is why the central bank should not target the change in the output-gap or
the growth in nominal income when inﬂation expectations are backward-looking. Second we
ﬁnd that even when inﬂation expectations are forward-looking, regimes that targets inﬂation
outperforms regimes that target the change in the output-gap and the growth in nominal
income. This result is very diﬀerent from those obtained by Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003).
The introduction of an information lag reduces the beneﬁts of precommitment. With an
information lag, private agents cannot incorporate the most recent policy-makers decision
and hence its likely impact on future economic outcomes. One of the main advantage of
commitment is its ability to appropriately aﬀect private agent’s expectations and hence
their current expenditure decisions. However, if expectations are predetermined and the
actions of the central bank are not forecastable in advance, then this limits the ability of
the central bank to inﬂuence the decisions and expectations of private agents, since agents
cannot incorporate the latest policy decisions of the central bank in their decision-making
process. As a result, the need for credible promises becomes less valuable. This is why the
11In this case also, it is optimal to appoint a conservative central bank.
17stabilization bias and the need for optimal delegation are reduced.
Dennis and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2002) obtain a similar result when they use the model of Rude-
busch (2002), that is structurally similar to our simple model. In fact, they obtain an
even stronger result–there is practically no diﬀerence between precommitment and discre-
tion in the Rudebusch (2002) framework—since the Rudebusch model embodies even more
backward-looking pricing behaviour.
Moreover, in a framework with information lags, the central bank can no longer perfectly
insulate the economy from demand shocks. Unless shocks are perfectly forecastable by
agents, even demand shocks have an impact on the macroeconomic variables. This is not
the case in the baseline New Keynesian model where policy-makers can perfectly insulate the
economy from demand shocks. It is well known that precommitment is especially valuable
in improving the inﬂation—output-gap trade-oﬀ when the economy is predominantly hit
with shocks that pose society with a trade-oﬀ, such as a cost-push shock. On the other
hand, when shocks such as demand and technology—that poses no trade-oﬀ to society—
become increasingly important as in the framework with an information lag, the need for
precommitment is greatly reduced. This is the second reason why the size of the stabilization
bias is reduced in a model featuring an information lag.
This also explains why delegating monetary policy to central bank that targets nominal
income growth or the change in the output gap become less attractive. A downside of
targeting the change in nominal income is that it is not very eﬃcient in dealing with shocks
that pose no trade-oﬀ to society. Since the central bank cannot perfectly insulate the economy
from demand shocks when an information lag is introduced, this makes a regimes of NIT
growth less attractive.
5 Concluding Remarks
Using a New Keynesian framework that incorporates an explicit lag in the actions of the
central bank, our results show that the size of the stabilization bias and the choice of optimal
delegation can be quite diﬀerent. The common belief among central bankers is that monetary
policy aﬀects the economy with a lag. Moreover, if agent’s consumption and investment
decisions are largely predetermined, this suggests that the stabilization bias may not be so
severe after all. Obviously this deserves more attention and remains an open issue.
Moreover, optimal delegation in such a framework amounts to targeting inﬂation in a
conservative manner. This result is very diﬀerent from those obtained using a conventional
18New Keynesian sticky price model. In such a framework, inﬂation targeting is inferior
to a regime that targets either the change in the output gap or nominal income growth.
Our results are robust and does not depend on the degree of forward or backward-looking
behaviour of agents. Since estimates of inﬂation expectations vary greatly in the literature,
the robustness of our result relative to this parameter is reassuring.
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